Performing from Heidegger’s *Turning*

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1. Introduction

In this essay I aim to do two things. 1) Describe aspects of the performance methodology and philosophy of my site-specific ecological performance group, The Environmental Performance Authority (EPA), as expressed in a series of performances entitled *Coastal Scales*, developed in conjunction with the Hobsons Bay Council in Melbourne, Australia. 2) Make an argument for the efficacy of The EPA’s work, through concepts from Heidegger’s later writings, with particular reference to the “turning”, and the occurrence of truth as the strife between earth and world, as developed in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1999; 2012) and “The origin of the work of art” (1977a). The essay outlines the performance process, and accounts for the role of Heidegger’s thinking in its devising, assessment and measure.

The EPA centres around a group of performers, trained in the practice of Bodyweather, founded by Butoh dancer Min Tanaka. Tanaka trained with Tatsumi Hijikata, one of the two founders of Butoh. Tanaka famously pronounced, “When I dance I don’t dance in the place but I am the place” (quoted in Viala and Masson-Sékiné 1988: 75). Tanaka’s claim is at the core of this project and the philosophy which underlies it. However, the claim implies such an apparent ontological reversal that it requires some explanation. The use of images from nature was an important part of Butoh method from the beginning. Tanaka commented that,

He [Hijikata] used about a thousand images from nature applied throughout the body, and I had to remember every one. Each day he changed the order of the movements. The images were of such elements as wind or sunshine, and he used them not to provide form, but to provide the inspiration. The movements were natural. (Tanaka, in Bergmark 1991)

Tanaka refined Hijikata’s use of natural images as the core of the Bodyweather method. However, before discussing the methodological processes and the philosophical implications and repercussions of the thinking underlying Tanaka’s statement, I will describe the project in question, the process and the place of the work.
2. **The Project—*Coastal Scales***

*Coastal Scales* is a collaboration between The EPA, Hobsons Bay City Council, geographers, environmental scientists, indigenous scholars and custodians, cultural historians and community groups.

The project entails a series of mobile site-specific performances in an urban coastal environment of preserved saltmarshes and estuarine wetlands, industrial graveyards, abandoned colonial buildings, manicured parklands built on top of a rubbish dump landfill, and semi-reconstituted scrubland. The site has been chosen for the richness and vulnerability of its natural and built environments, its Indigenous history, its industrial history, and its mix of current uses—including an oil refinery, dog walking, heavy industry, sports, water management, and botanical research in its pockets of fragile preserved ecologies, bird watching, and rubbish dumping.

There are 3 phases to the project:

i. **Distal Fragments**: a series of immersive participatory mobile site-specific walking performances through marsh, scrub and parkland

ii. **Explosive Measures**: a series of immersive site-specific performances and accompanying gallery installations in an abandoned explosives reserve and surrounding buildings

iii. **Atmospheric Tides**: a 72 hour site-specific performance with walks, gallery installations, on-site training, and audience inhabitations.

These performances take place in the Truganina Swamp, Truganina Park, and Truganina Explosives Reserves, in the municipality of Hobsons Bay City Council, on Port Phillip Bay, approximately 10 km from the Central Business District of Melbourne, Australia. Hobsons Bay is a traditional industrial area, with a still functioning oil refinery, logistics and storage facilities, and large-scale manufacturing. There are substantial pockets of residential inhabitation, some dating back to the mid 19th Century, but mostly built during and since the prosperity booms of the 1950s-1960s. With the exception of some high-end dwellings around the area of Altona Beach, it is traditionally a working and lower-middle class area. Paradoxically, this industrial heritage has left undeveloped large tracts of what would otherwise be prime residential bayside land. The Truganina Swamp, Park and Explosives Reserve and surrounding coastlines have been partially preserved, allowing original estuarine...
environments, migratory bird nesting sites and delicate flora and fauna to flourish. The performances aim to work in and with these environments to allow them to reveal their textures, rhythms, speeds, colours, temperatures, scales and intensities through providing an experience of them for audiences.

3. The Method—Giving-Over-To and Being-Moved-By

The aim is not to produce a performance to be appreciated for its the aesthetic excellence or the skill of the performers, but to create immersive environments which draw audience attention to the place itself. It involves three components: 1) sustained inhabitations of the site, employing Bodyweather techniques to perform embodied analyses of the materiality of the place according to such measures as speed, weight, density, porosity, direction, colour, texture and other tangible physical qualities; 2) archival and oral histories of Indigenous and non-Indigenous inhabitation of the area, including consultation with Indigenous elders and “friends groups” to unearth the weave of stories that constitute the meanings of the place; and 3) qualitative investigation with local residents to map the emotional/affective experiences of the moods and atmospheres of the place. This essay does not provide sufficient space to discuss the second and third phases in any detail and will concentrate on the embodied inhabitations.

The work also takes heed of, responds to and emerges from the ecology within the performance group itself, and its close collaborations with researchers and local council. In the work of the EPA, the term ecology is broadly understood as the relationships in which something is embedded and which allow its specific emergence as what it is. When the performers enter the site, they become a determining part of its ecology, as do institutional, cultural and historical factors. These are not metaphors but determining, effective ecological structures. This places multiple ethical responsibilities on the group. There are often conflicting interests at play among the various organisations with which the EPA is working. It is a delicate matter to balance the maintenance of a critical approach in working with such interests. Nevertheless, there is a general awareness in all parties of the need to respect and protect these environments for their own intrinsic value (however difficult this might be to assess), not only for their use value to the human inhabitants. The worth and measure of the performance is in its response to these circumstances. The ultimate guiding aim is to create an sufficiently affecting experience to make a lasting impact on ongoing attitudes and behaviour towards these specific ecologies, and to questions of environment more generally.
The primary performative method of the EPA in the Hobsons Bay project is the “Dictionary of Atmospheres”, invented by Bodyweather performer and teacher Tess de Quincey (Grant 2013a). In this method, dancers immerse themselves in an environment through a tripartite method of “elements, attractors and atmospheres”. They move through a place until attracted by a specific object or arrangement of objects, a feeling, a material quality, a dimension, or any other feature of the landscape which catches their attention with a degree of intensity which makes them stop and give further examination. They then spend time with the attractor, analysing the elements which constitute it: physical and sensible qualities such as weight, density, porosity, speed, permeability, direction, scale, smell, colour, moistness, texture. These elements or qualities are experienced intensively, as the components which constitute the material atmosphere of the place. The attraction is an expression of the performer’s trained sensitivity to the processes, sensations, rhythms and movements of their own body, and its availability to attunement with that particular atmosphere. This embodied awareness of the imbrication and congruence of the harmonics of place and body becomes the source material for the performance. These atmospheres are gathered by the group of performers and compiled as the Dictionary of Atmospheres of that place.

The ability to “give-over-to” the place is key to this method. The stated EPA priority of creating performances which aim to highlight the place itself rather than the aesthetic appreciation of the performers requires the trained body of the performer to be available to “be-moved-by” the place. The Bodyweather method offers a number of exercises which aim at giving-over-to and being-moved-by, literally, metaphorically and imaginatively. For example, in one such exercise, “bag-of-bones”, members of the group take turns in allowing their own relaxed, limp body to be manipulated and moved by a group of three to five other performers who use their own bodies to position, fold, carry and shape the body of the person being moved. The exercise ends with a short improvisation in which the moved person recreates the sensation of the movements given to them by the other members. It is important to note that the aim is not to mimic or reproduce the movements but to recreate the sensory experience of being-moved. Other exercises in being-moved-by are based on establishing relationships between the place and the body, through such exercises as imagined strings attaching parts of the body to points in the place, and allowing the movements in the environment to determine the movements of the body. Again, the aim is not a direct mimicry, but the establishment of a relationship, imaginary or perceptual, which allows the body to be moved by external forces. Performers also use imaginal techniques such as “I am up to my ankles/knees/thighs/waist in honey”, or “I
am inhabiting the space between grains of sand”, or “my body is a swarm of dots”. Bag-of-bones and these other exercises are all givings-over-to perceived external or imaginary forces and forms, which aim at sensitizing and softening the body, preparing it to be susceptible to being-moved-by the environment. The body, thus prepared, is taken into immersion in the nuances of the texture and qualities of the environment, to register slight variations in the elements which constitute the atmospheres of the place—dark and heavy, light, happy, uplifting, menacing, disturbing, welcoming, expansive, claustrophobic.

In this way the ecological ethic is directly and profoundly enacted in the practice. The ethical decision to giving-over-to the priority of the place is a responsible radical passivity, which lets the place take precedence over the human body; and the body, rather than a site of agency, becomes a site of response where its own surfaces, weights, textures and resistances become sites of a sensitive, receptive and responsive allowance to the surfaces, weights, textures and resistances of the place.

It should be noted that the technique becomes more effective the more it moves away from a simple mimetic representation of the place toward an intensive embodiment of the qualities of the place. One aspect of the work is an ongoing analysis of the different levels of mimesis, from direct imitation to processes of being-moved-by internal responses to exterior perceptual stimuli. Most importantly, the work is an investigation of the question of how the techniques of being-moved-by and giving-over-to work for audiences. What immersive and participatory experiences and activities should be offered to an audience to break down the distanced, representational, theatrical stance of the spectator in order to let them into the place? Is it possible that work devised through more mimetic performance techniques holds the audience at a distance from the performance in spectatorial mode, and positions them in a manner which inhibits an in-depth experience of the place?

In the remainder of this article, I will give a brief overview of some key ideas in Heidegger’s later work as a way of providing a theoretical underpinning for such investigations into letting both performer and audience enter the coming-forth of the place. I will argue that Heidegger’s approach in the Contributions to Philosophy (1999; 2012) constitutes a performative mode of entry into Being. I will contend that the deep immersive giving-over-to of Bodyweather can be understood as a living enactment of a structure of relationship which Heidegger proposes as a radical refiguring of human insertion in and emergence from earth and world. I will show how the practice offers a concrete, performative means which opens a possibility of the escape which Heidegger sought from representational metaphysics. More explicitly, I will suggest that
the embodied methods of giving-over-to and being-moved-by constitute a practical living
inception of Heidegger’s concept of “the turning”, and thus allow the entry into the
“fundamental occurrence” of Being, to overcome the devastating, calculating enframing of
representational metaphysics.

However, before proceeding to the relevant concepts from Heidegger’s work, I will, for the
sake of clarity, as far as space will allow, discuss how this work departs from other
Heideggerian approaches to ecology.

4. A Diversion on Heidegger

The application of Heidegger in the work of the EPA stems from a specific set of writings from
1936-41. I would note that there are other, more well-established applications of Heidegger’s
work in the field of environmental philosophy.

First, most applications of Heidegger’s ideas on place and dwelling in the fields of ecology and
environmental philosophy stem from his essays “Building Dwelling Thinking” (1971a), “The
Question Concerning Technology” (1977b) and “…Poetically Man Dwells…” (1971b). These
short essays deal briefly with concepts of *Gestell* (enframing), and the “fourfold” of earth, sky,
mortality and the awaiting of the gods. Although related to the ideas employed here, they are
not key concepts for the EPA, whose work stems from writings have only been published and
translated over the last two decades, and then only partially, as: *Contributions to Philosophy*
(1999, 2012a), *Mindfulness* (2006), and *The Event* (2012b). In these thousands of pages of
dense, fractured, repetitive, idiosyncratic prose, Heidegger sets out with the explicitly
performative intention of not “talking ‘about’ something and representing something
objective”, but “enacting a saying” which “does not describe or explain, does not proclaim or
teach...does not stand over against what is said...rather the saying itself is the ‘to be said’”
(1999: 3-4). These experiments instantiate a complex, radical, fundamental shift in thinking,
with offer new insights into the question of how to inhabit the earth. The work of the EPA, in
its philosophical dimension, is a performed response to these writings.

Second, I address Carl Lavery’s (2012) succinct summary of some common interpretations of
and assumptions about Heidegger’s work, and how it might or might not be appropriate or
useful to the meeting of performance and ecology. In a discussion with artist Simon Whitehead,
Lavery outlines possible “dangers inherent in Heideggerian thought” (111). It is not possible
here to do justice to the complexity of the debates surrounding Heidegger, but I will aim to
point readers to some key sources.
Least problematically, Heidegger is criticised as essentialist. The misunderstanding of the term essence is at the core of a great deal of criticism of phenomenology. Heidegger’s contribution to phenomenology is precisely his hermeneutic move of introducing the principle of the *Abgrund*, the denial of any possibility of attaining absolute basic principles. For Heidegger, the concept essence is tied to its root *esse* to be, and as such is about *Ereignis*, the event, the enactment of coming-forth. By the time of the *Contributions*, Heidegger’s use of *Wesen* and *Wesung* is always as essencing, translated most recently as “fundamental occurring”. For Heidegger, being and essence are active, pure verb (Heidegger 2012a: 205-206; 212; Vallega 2001: 61).

Lavery also refers to Michael Zimmerman’s journey from aficionado to sceptic across a series of articles in the 1980-90s (Zimmerman 1983, 1986, 1990, 1993). Zimmerman’s turn away from Heidegger was prompted by the latter’s engagement with National Socialism. The question of Heidegger’s relationship with the German government of 1933-45 is the subject of a great deal of debate, most recently reignited with the publication of his private “Black Notebooks” (Heidegger 2014). Again, this is not the place to rehearse these arguments in detail. Positions in the argument range from complete rejection of all Heidegger’s work, to seeking implicit evidence of Nazism in his philosophy, to preserving the importance of the philosophy while questioning the character of the man, to outright apologists. Richard Polt (2014) gives a most balanced appraisal.

Lavery also notes that Heidegger’s work tells us “little about ontic specifics, about how, that is, artists and spectators engage in this eternal (re)turning” (113). This is correct. Heidegger is clear that his work in this area is preparatory (2012a: 11, 13, 66, 68, 241, 256). The scale and scope of the task are epochal. The way of the new thinking cannot be prescribed or predicted but only unconcealed in its performance. Heidegger does not give us a guidebook, but points a way. The work of the EPA attempts to enact Heidegger’s directive.

Lavery also rehearses arguments on anthropomorphism and the lack of “body” in Heidegger’s work (113). These are well-trodden debates. I would merely point to the concept of the “standing reserve”, according to which,

> Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs. (Heidegger, cited in Davis 2007: 257)
Here, the enframing of technology reduces the human, the animal, the vegetable and the mineral to a “standing reserve” for human consumption and usage. Surely, this is a scandalously profound challenge to the limits of the human, and what “we share with other animals and elements on earth” (Lavery & Whitehead 2012: 113). Most importantly, Heidegger here figures all these events as a product of a specific metaphysical standpoint, linking the most transcendent with the most worldly.

I do not wish to take more space here with these concerns. I proceed here on the principle that the only measure of a philosophy is how it calls us to think and act. I am not interested in arguing against either Lavery or Heidegger. The work of the EPA takes specific instances of Heidegger’s thinking and uses them to directly inspire performative methodological practices. I feel it would be spurious to reject, on the basis of debates which are by no means resolved, the ways, discussed here, in which concepts such as Gelassenheit have illuminated, deepened and enhanced our understanding of practices such as being-moving by and giving-over-to. The concepts of the turning and others elaborated here have shown us ways towards modes of performance, reported here, which have given us a finely nuanced understanding of the ecological implications of our own insertion into the sites in which we work. Moreover, as I have intimated here, and argued at length elsewhere, these criticisms are, more often than not, based in a partial and often erroneous reading of Heidegger (Grant 2013b).

5. Ecophenomenological Performance

As an application of Heidegger to place-based performance, the work of the EPA is ecophenomenology. The performance methodology is an activation of an ecophenomenological ethics. Briefly, the term ecophenomenological is understood in David Wood’s terms as “the pursuit of the relationalities of worldly engagement, both human and those of other creatures” (2003: 213). It is phenomenological insofar as it figures these relations as intentional, and it attempts “a recovery of the relation to the Sache selbst”, the things themselves (212). As stated, it does this through a performance which lets the place be. Philosophically, the methods of the performance work are instantiations of Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit (releasement), according to which “insofar as we can at least disaccustom ourselves to willing, we contribute to the awakening of releasement” (2010: 69). The fundamental philosophical imperative of the performers’ work is to release the place, as an offer of a way in for the audience, and then to allow the experience to develop. In a sense,
if the performance itself becomes the object of the audience’s attention, it fails. This philosophical imperative is the fundamental impulse of the performance.

There is as yet no literature on this period of Heidegger’s work specifically referring to site-based or ecological performance. David Wood (2002: 153-188) has written of a “performative imperative” in the Contributions; Daniela Vallega-Neu makes brief but undeveloped references to a “performative listening and reading” (2003: 31-32); others have found links between language and the performative in earlier Heidegger (Anton 1998; Feldman 2000; Schalow 2003) but nothing specifically about performance rather than the performative. There is similarly little application of the Contributions in ecophenomenology. The most significant work is Bruce Bannon’s From Mastery to Mystery (2013). Bannon use of the Contributions as a guide to establishing a “non-dominating relationship with the non-human world” (12) has had a profound effect on the work of the EPA. In the field of phenomenological performance the main influence is Nigel Stewart, in particular, “Dancing the face of place: environmental dance and eco-phenomenology” (2010) and “Dancing the time of place: fieldwork, phenomenology and nature’s choreography” (2005).

6. The Turning

Heidegger’s contribution to the phenomenological tradition is the introduction of a non-aprioristic hermeneutics. The fundamental thought of hermeneutics is the hermeneutic circle, first introduced by Schleiermacher in his insight into the co-constitution of self and language:

An act of speaking cannot even be understood as a moment in a person’s development unless it is also understood in relation to the language. This is because the linguistic heritage modifies our mind.

Nor can an act of speaking be understood as a modification of the language unless it is also understood as a moment in the development of the person (later addition: because an individual is able to influence a language by speaking, which is how a language develops). (1985: 75)

Heidegger’s work can be read in one sense as an ever more fundamental radicalisation of this structure of mutual codetermination, reaching its most complete expression in his idea of “the turning” (2012: 246-47). The persistent impulse in this aspect of Heidegger’s work is the
attempt to escape oppositions—between beings and Being, world and earth, human and being, truth as correspondence and correctness. Heidegger refigures all of these apparent oppositions as relationships of mutual co-requirement. The turning is a refiguring of the question of the relationship of the human to its environments. In the turning, the human is considered as an emergence of the environment it inhabits. The things of the world are not conceived as “out there”, as objects held over against a subject, but are involved in belonging co-immersion. Rather than a subject which has others, human and non-human, as objects, represented in systems, the turning frames the human as situated in and determined by its others in a mutually creative “oscillation” or “counter-resonance” which brings forth both as emergences of a process Heidegger calls Beyng (Seyn) (1999: 169, 180, 182, 2012: 189, 200, 203). Beyng is not a quality which beings possess, as in the beingness of beings, but the process which occurs when the interpretive thrown-projection of human Dasein (the human, expressed in terms of its ways of being-there) opens the worlds to which it belongs and without which it could not exist. The human is no longer the representing spectator of the world arrayed before it, but is intrinsically implicated in it. The human is responsible for the disclosure of the world, for bringing it to light. The things of the world are unconcealed as what they are by the human engagement with them.

For Heidegger, this disclosure is the site of truth. He replaces the everyday contemporary idea of truth as correctness and correspondence with a more fundamental idea of truth as the uncovering-bringing-forth of what is. Heidegger retrieves this sense of truth from the Greek aletheia, unforgetting. Truth is the process by which the unconcealment of what is, fundamentally occurs (2012: 259-292). In “The origin of the work of art” Heidegger describes this fundamental occurrence of the coming forth of truth as the “strife between earth and world” (1977a: 174). The strife between earth and world is an exemplary instance of mutual co-belonging.

World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The world grounds itself on the earth and earth juts through world. Yet the relationship between world and earth does not wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there. (174)
So earth and world, like *Dasein* and Being, require each other. “The earth cannot dispense with the open region of the world…the world in turn cannot soar out of the earth’s sight” (174). This strife of earth and world is the occurrence of the movement of clearing and concealing which Heidegger calls truth as unconcealment. One key site where this happens is the work of art.

Truth establishes itself in the work. Truth essentially occurs only as the strife between clearing and concealing in the opposition of world and earth. Truth wills to be established in the work as this strife of world and earth. (187)

In Heideggerian terms, the performance methodology of the EPA very literally enjoins the strife between earth and world. It sets up a clearing and in so doing allows earth to be unconcealed in its concealedness. The performers work with the sheltered concealment of earth, never fully understanding and encompassing it, but aim to set up worlds as hermeneutic clearings, interpretations which others can experience. However, ultimately, in the experience of those worlds, the audience members are confronted with the impenetrability of earth as it juts through those worlds. Earth is never revealed naked and indiscreet but only shows-forth shrouded in and as its mystery and hiddenness: “the gravity of stone, the mute hardness of wood, the dark glow of colors” (187). All the performance can do is set up hermeneutic worlds in which performers and audience reserve and preserve the shelteredness of earth. There is no all-revealing mastery, but rather an invitation to enjoin the strife.

So, in and from the immersion of the turning, through giving-over-to and the being-moved-by, the performance methodology aims to enact the oscillating counter-resonance of the performers and the place through which worlds are set up and the concealedness of earth juts forth. This fundamentally occurs as the setting up of worlds. The world of the performance offers no comprehension of the earth but aims to become its vehicle. The performative entry into the turning, as a way of uncovering and showing aspects of the place, becomes, in Heideggerian terms, the site where truth *occurs* as strife of earth and world. The performance is a place where truth as unconcealing *happens*. As performative, the performance is not *about* the place, in the same way that Heidegger’s writings in the *Contributions* are not *about* anything, but are “sayings” which bring forth that which they say (1999: 4). As performative, the performance enacts the place, is *of* the place, emerges *from* the place, as the in-stance-ing instauration of the
place, the setting up of a world. The performance strives towards the non-mimetic, the non-narrative, through the being-moving-by, and carries it into the audience to allow them to be-moving-by the performance into the place.

In this Heideggerian sense, the Dictionary of Atmospheres constitutes a projecting-open of a world which opens a way into the place for the audience. It does not tell stories but opens the place through allowing it to emerge as truth in the oscillating counter-resonance of the strife of earth and world. There is certainly a great deal of prior research that goes into the performance, into the Indigenous and non-Indigenous stories and histories, the knowledge of the flora and fauna, the migratory birds, the geology, and some of this finds its way into the performance as content. But primarily, the role of the research is to sensitize the performers to the nuances and subtleties of the qualities of the place, to soften them so that the thrown-projecting-open of the being-moving-by and the giving-over-to—to the winds, the temperatures, the forms, the textures, the smells—can allow the bodies of the performers to be the carriers of the resonances of the place and to carry-forth those resonances as counter-resonances opened for the audience.

7. Reservedness

Audience members and performers commented on how aspects of the work that caught the slowness and stillness of the place, movements which harmonized with the intrinsic rhythms, were more affecting than faster, more overtly danced impositions. Also, the more the movements directly resembled the movements of the place and the things in it, the more theatrical and representational it became, the more it set the audience up in an enframed spectatorial mode, and the less it opened up an immersion for the audience. For instance, at one point in the performance, a scene in which dancers raised their arms in the shape of swans’ necks broke a very meditative mood with laughter. On the other hand, movements which sought to recreate sensations which occurred as a result of the encounter with the place were more affecting for the audience than more mimetic representational movements. This was exemplified by exercises in which audience members were asked to repeat the same processes the performers had undertaken in devising the work. Exercises of swallowing the wind, softening the body, allowing the wind to move and permeate it, giving-over-to the place, created a greater sense of belonging in a mode of listening to the place. In discussions, many audience members commented on the enjoyment and effectiveness of these exercises. In another scene, in a dusty clearing, where performers were separated into a gallery of individual embodied images derived specifically from listening with the full body to the speeds of the
place, audience members were asked to be silent for a sustained period, and commented that the intense degree of concentration made them more aware of the sounds and textures of the environment, and drew them into the rhythms, attitudes and orientations captured by the listening bodies of the performers.

It is in the reservedness, the stillness, the silence, the listening, the slowness, the holding-back, that the performance allows the place to show itself as it is. The overt performance of the stillness and silence invites the audience into the fundamental attunement of reservedness, allowing them to use the performance to enter into the place in a way to which normal everyday modes—strolling, walking the dog, thinking of the affairs of the daily business, even in a most relaxed mode, cannot attain.

The attunement of reservedness or restraint (Verhaltenheit), is central to Heidegger’s preparation for the performative leap into the “inceptual” thinking which would escape representative metaphysics (2012: 51). Reservedness, silence, and stillness are all intimately tied up with the truth of the disclosure of world and the concealedness of earth.

Thus the deep stillness must first come over the world for the earth. This stillness only springs forth from reticence (keeping silent). And this reticence (bringing into silence) only grows only out of reservedness. As grounding attunement, reservedness thoroughly tunes the intimacy of the strife between world and earth and thus the strifing of the onset of enownment. (1999: 25)

Moreover, “reservedness is the ground of care…reservedness of Da-sein first of all grounds care as the inabiding that sustains the t/here [Da]” (25). This suggests that reservedness and restraint are also necessary conditions of the coming-forth of place. The concept of Dasein, which, in Being and Time (1962), has been conceived as the essence of human being, undergoes a transformation in the Contributions, to become the action of the opening of “time-space”, the condition of possibility of time and space (2012: 299). This time-space occurs through the thrown-projecting-open of human understanding, but sustains into an emergence into a t/here through the staying-with of inabiding care. But this inabiding care requires reservedness as its ground. So it would seem that a performance sufficient to allow the place itself to emerge must be grounded in restraint and reservedness.
8. Final Note

Clearly, there is much to be unravelled here. This article is necessarily written in dense Heideggerian language rife with neologisms, translations, retranslations, unconventional usages and philologically derived redefinitions. Complex Heideggerian terms such as care, strife, projecting-open, earth, world, truth, require thorough introductory definition for the reader of performance studies. For instance, the word *Verhaltenheit* contains echoes of holding, withholding, holding open, stopping, and staying. Daniela Vallega-Neu writes of “a staying with speechlessness, a staying turned toward the occurrence of beyng …attuned by reservedness…listening to beyng’s compelling call…that Heidegger will rethink in his later works as *das Gelaut der Stille* (“the gathered sounding of silence”) (2001: 74).

The necessity of this renovation of language is crucial to Heidegger’s project. He is seeking a way out of Western metaphysics to establish a completely new relationship with Being and consequently with the ways in which humans manifest the world for themselves. A new language is required to unconceal the world anew. Accordingly, in the *Contributions*, Heidegger embarks on a series of performative writing experiments to attempt a “leap” at a new thinking. The *Contributions* proposes a performative solution to the problem of metaphysics, precisely because it escapes existent usages, and listens to find the new language appropriate to its coming-forth and realisation.

In the case of the EPA performance methodology described here, it needs to be stressed that Heidegger’s thinking is not a blunt, after-the-fact, analogizing interpretation of the work, but a concrete starting point, a formative inspiration for the development of the method. Heidegger’s performative new thinking provides fundamental principles and approaches which animate a performance methodology by which a new relation between the earth and the human might be ventured.

The performance work, although derived from a specific tradition of Butoh and Bodyweather, is a direct application of Heidegger’s thinking. It is so because the thinking of the turning, as an attempt at an entirely new conceptualisation of the relationship between humans and their worlds, offers a way to an ecophenomenological performance. This mode of performance is an embodied instantiation of a thinking in which the human is no longer the star of the show, but catches attention, stands aside and draws the audience into a dwelling with the place.

Finally, the ultimate justification which unites both Heidegger’s performative writings and the work of the EPA is a sense of the emergency which necessitates this work.
Heidegger:

Therein is decided the future of humans. They may for centuries still ravish and devastate the planet with their machinations, and the monstrousness of this drive may “develop” to an inconceivable extent, assume the form of an apparent strictness, and become the measuring regulation of the devastated as such; the greatness of beyng will remain closed off, since decisions about truth and untruth no longer arise. All that matters is the calculation of the success and failure of the machinations. This calculation extends into a presumed “eternity”, which is not such but is only the endless “and so on” of what is most desolate and most fleeting. (2012: 324)

The stakes are high: the future of humanity, the future of the earth, the future of science, and the relationship with the divine. In the face of such high stakes, this short article on a still-forming relationship between some philosophical concepts and a site-specific performance technique, can only hint or point towards a beginning recognition of the potential that this period of Heidegger’s work has for devising a proposed mode of site-specific ecological performance which aims to create the possibility of a new kind of thinking and acting based in a relation of giving-over-to-being-moved-by the environment.

References


1 Much of the work of preservation of ecosystems, and historical sites is maintained by volunteer “friends groups” sponsored by the local Council. The Truganina Explosive Reserve Preservation Society, which was responsible for running the campaign which ensured that this historical industrial site was not redeveloped for residential purposes, is working very closely with the project, providing speakers as well as extensive archival material.


4 Emad and Maly translate Verhaltenheit as “reservedness”. Rojewicz and Vallega-Neu use “restraint”.

5 The parenthesized interpolations in this paragraph are from Rojewicz and Vallega-Neu’s translation. The main body is Emad and Maly.